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BBC Independence and Impartiality:
The Case of the 1956 Suez Crisis 





For a working journalist, especially one in the BBC, the theoretical discussion is not
very helpful. It is essential to have some kind of understanding of what impartiality
could – and perhaps even should – look like in practice, even if it is a struggle to
define it rigorously in theory […] It is true that it should be seen as an aspiration
rather than a measurable goal. That it is a collection of characteristics rather than a
formal definition. And that it will change over time.1
1 The nature  and degree  of  independence  and impartiality  at  the  British  Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC)  have  been  a  source  of  debate  throughout  the  organization’s  long
history of radio and television. Impartiality is not to be confused here with objectivity.
The former is more commonly used in British journalism whereas the latter is more
widespread  in  the  United  States.  Impartiality  is  to  be  understood  as  a  sense  of
detachment  and an absence of  bias  when presenting opposing viewpoints,  whereas
objectivity  is  concerned  with  picking  out  evidence  and  facts,  and  balance  merely
involves  providing equal  space to  differing opinions.  Communication theorist  Denis
McQuail categorized bias into five types but, as he stated, these are non-exhaustive.2
Impartiality  therefore  cannot  be  described  in  absolute  terms  but  rather  as  an
aspiration, which requires normative judgments as to which elements to include in a
given news story. 
2 The BBC quickly established itself as a social institution with a nationalizing function
that has been contributing to definitions of the “national community” ever since.3 This
has involved processes of inclusion and exclusion, which have played a decisive role in
reflecting particular representations of cultural life back on the nation.  Indeed, the
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broadcaster  has  been expressing ideas  about  identity,  nationhood and conflict  ever
since its foundation as a commercial company in 1922, at a time when the Irish Free
State seceded from what was then the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.
From the outset, the company’s general manager John Reith insisted that it should be
both a public and independent institution removed from government and corporate
interference.4 He pictured a public service broadcaster answerable only to a superior
cultural  ideal  that  would allow radio listeners  to  be uplifted.5 This  line of  thinking
contributed  to  the  BBC  being  chartered  as  a  public  service  corporation  in  1927,
following a report by the Crawford Committee. It was believed that the instrument of a
royal  charter  and  licence  agreements  were  best  suited  to  a  publicly  funded  but
editorially and journalistically independent institution. The concepts of independence
and impartiality were inscribed in the BBC’s first royal charter6 and governments from
that time forth instructed the broadcaster to refrain from giving personal opinions
regarding current affairs and public policy.7 Reith’s legacy may be viewed as that of a
public  service  ethos,  the  nature  of  which  was  already  evolving  by  the  time  of  his
departure from the BBC in 1938. However, the charter also provided for a government
veto power over programming and the authority to revoke the Corporation’s licence.
Additional  sources  of  structural  and  financial  pressure  on  BBC  independence  and
impartiality included the government’s authority to appoint the Corporation’s Board of
Governors and control over the annual television licence fee. 
3 BBC notions of independence and impartiality have since evolved in practice against a
backdrop of societal and technological change.8 The earliest interpretations of these
key  tenets  consisted  of  simply  airing  government  policy  views  and  those  of  the
Opposition,9 in a limited vision of due balance. The broadcaster’s position was quickly
tested as  successive  governments  sought  favourable  coverage  –  albeit  with  varying
degrees  of  success.  Some  notable  examples  include  reporting  of  the  1926  General
Strike,10 the crisis surrounding Edward VIII’s abdication in 1936,11 the Spanish Civil War
from 1936 to 1939,12 Prime Minister Arthur Chamberlain’s pre-Second World War policy
of appeasement.13 However, the 1956 Suez Crisis is of particular interest here in that it
demonstrates  the  struggles  of  the  BBC to  fulfil  its  mission  as  an  independent  and
impartial  broadcaster  in  the  context  of  the  Government’s  lingering  attachment  to
empire. The emerging specificities of BBC radio and television journalism will first be
considered  in  order  to  situate  the  Corporation’s  concern  with  independence and
impartiality. Government attitudes towards the BBC will then be placed in the context
of the British Empire’s decline and the strategic importance of the Suez Canal. Finally,
attention will  be  drawn to  interference with the  Corporation at  the  highest  levels,
particularly with respect to the Government’s propaganda war at home and abroad in
favour of military action. 
 
The Emergence of BBC Journalism
[…] journalism matters because it has a uniquely privileged cultural status, placing
it  (and  journalists)  at  the  centre  of  public  life  and  political  debate  ever  since
journalists first began to irritate kings, queens and popes in early modern Europe.14 
4 The  BBC  has  changed  perceptions  regarding  the  role  of  journalism  and  how  the
journalism of public service broadcasting can be compared to that of other media,
particularly the well-established press industry.15 This may be explained in the context
of  the BBC’s  early  radio  history,  competition with the newspaper  industry  and the
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growth of Post-Second World War television. Journalism is considered here as an ideal-
typical value system, in which the public service ideal gives practitioners legitimacy as
gatekeepers and watchdogs. Indeed, the occupation may be seen “as a collection of shared
but continuously contested values that define how proper journalists should act or at what they
should aim”.16 The content and style of British journalism were predominantly defined
by the commercial printing press until the BBC’s radio services began in 1922. The early
twentieth  Century  had seen fierce  competition  within  the  newspaper  industry,  the
rapid growth in circulation of the popular press amongst the working class and the
advent  of  the  modern  tabloid  format.  By  the  late  1920s,  BBC  radio  was  hesitantly
developing its own network of journalists and sources independent from those of the
printed  press,  although  it  was  only  in  1934  that  the  Corporation  founded  a  news
department. BBC radio thus gradually sought to distinguish itself from the so-called
sensationalism of mass-circulation printed press by forging “its own notions of taste, tact
and propriety”.17 
5 Early television news, in turn, was influenced by BBC radio journalism in both form and
style. This was demonstrated in 1954 by the Corporation’s first televised news bulletin,
which was mostly made up of a still image and voice-only narration.18 The decision by
Winston  Churchill’s  Conservative  government  to  allow  commercial  broadcasting  in
1955 marked the end of  the BBC’s  monopoly  over  the  small  screen and acted as  a
catalyst  for  an  era  of  greater  competition  in  television  news  production.  The  BBC
sought to respond to newly founded Independent Television (later renamed ITV) and its
particular  brand  of  journalism,  which  was  aimed  at  increasing  ratings.  Independent
Television News (ITN) strategies included vox pops and a more adversarial journalistic
approach when interviewing politicians. In this respect, post-Second World War media
history can “be seen very largely as a process of adjustment by and to TV”.19 In the 1960s,
BBC television news would go on to  be strengthened with the founding of  the Ten
O’Clock  News,  a  daily  news and current  affairs  programme,  which included fact  and
comment.  The  BBC  was  praised  for  its  espousal  of  public  service  broadcasting
principles  as  demonstrated  by  the  1962  report  of  the  parliamentary  Pilkington
Committee  on  Broadcasting.  The  report  was  critical  of  ITV’s  focus  on  ratings  and
concluded  that  there  was  an  “overwhelming  mass  of  disinterested  opinion”  regarding
commercial broadcasting.20 Legal commercial radio would not begin until 1973.
6 Limits  to  the  BBC’s  independence  were  perhaps  most  readily accepted  at  an
institutional level during the Second World War, as national survival and victory took
primacy and propaganda was considered an invaluable tool. In particular, the war
showed the key role played by overseas broadcasting.21 BBC radio news programmes
were paramount for morale on the home front but also for rallying troops and allies
abroad. However staunchly the Corporation claimed to defend its editorial and political
independence at that time, such discourse must be treated with scepticism given that
news  “was  determined  by  the  necessity  of  winning  the  war”  and  national  survival.22
However, the colonial battles of the 1940s and 1950s, as well as the Cold War between
the Soviet Union and the United States, marked a new chapter for the BBC. There was
fear that nationalist movements would facilitate the spread of communism.23 In this
context, the Corporation strove to portray itself as an impartial and independent news
provider,  all  the  while  playing  a  nationalizing  function  as  an  authoritative  arbiter
between competing definitions of community.
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A Lingering Attachment to an Empire in Decline
The Government intend that the Corporation should remain independent in the
preparation of programs for overseas audiences, although it should obtain from the
government departments concerned such information about conditions in those
countries and the policy of His Majesty’s government towards them as will permit it
to plan its programs in the national interest.24
7 BBC  claims  to  independence  and  impartiality  in  post-war  broadcasting  need  to  be
understood  in  the  context  of  mass  decolonisation:  From 1945  until  the  end  of  the
Century,  no  less  than ninety-six  new states  were  founded as  a  consequence of  the
decolonisation process. British international broadcasting began with the launch of the
BBC Empire Service in 1932, reaching the African continent, Australasia, British Guiana,
Burma, Canada, the Federated Malay States, India, Trinidad and the West Indies. The
service was renamed General Forces Service in 1944, General Overseas Service in 1947 and
External  Services in  1948,  before  being  consolidated  into  the  World  Service in  1965. 25
Originally aimed at English-speakers throughout the British Empire, the Corporation
broadcast in forty languages by 1959.26 Overseas services grew exponentially and were
funded by government revenues rather than by the domestic licence fee.27
8 However, the BBC’s transition from supportive representations of British imperialism
to those of a multicultural Commonwealth cannot simply be described in the linear
terms suggested by the multiple renaming of its  international broadcasting service.
Post-Second World War programming reflected the complexities and inconsistencies of
government attitudes and policies towards colonized peoples.28 In a 1945 memo, BBC
Director-General William Haley stated his belief  that the British were “nowhere near
finished in [their] island or world story”.29 Such claims to empire and an island story as
features of national identity reflected a deeply rooted imperial attitude that could still
be found in British society,  despite the fact  that  India was already on the brink of
independence. 
9 As  the  British  Empire  went  into  decline,  deference  towards  those  in  positions  of
authority  began  to  erode30 and  the  1956  Suez  Crisis  (also  known  as  the  Tripartite
Aggression) became a defining test for the BBC’s self-portrayal as an independent and
impartial  broadcaster.  When  the  newly  elected  Egyptian  President,  Gamal  Nasser,
announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 th July 1956, Anthony
Eden’s  Conservative  government  went  to  great  lengths  in  an  attempt  to  win  a
propaganda war on the home front and abroad.31 Press Secretary William Clark stated
that the Prime Minister “had instructed the Lord Chancellor […] to prepare an instrument
which would take over the BBC all together and subject it wholly to the will of the Government”.
32 
10 The  artificial  Suez  waterway  had  been  completed  in  1869  and  held  great  strategic
importance for British and French trade as it connected the Mediterranean and the Red
Sea. Indeed, the Middle East was home to the greatest identified crude oil reserve in the
1950s and the British had a strong colonial past and military presence in the region.33
On 24th October 1956, British, French and Israeli government representatives concluded
secret talks in Paris with the signing of an agreement, which later became known as the
Protocol of Sèvres. Together, they agreed to take military action in an attempt to reverse
Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company. In this context of collusion,
Israel invaded Egypt on 29th October,  while British and French forces landed in the
Canal Zone on 5th November.  A ceasefire was announced the following day and the
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withdrawal of forces took place on 18th November.  Yet the Suez Crisis took its toll,
culminating in Eden’s  resignation on 9th January 1957.  In the immediate aftermath,
Eden himself  reflected that  the experience had “not  so  much changed our  fortunes  as
revealed realities” with respect to the United Kingdom’s role in the world.34 His Egyptian
foreign  policy  failure  showed  his  fundamental  miscalculation  regarding  American
President Dwight Eisenhower who favoured a peaceful settlement. It was the first time
the United Nations had sent a peacekeeping force (United Nations Emergency Force) to
oversee the end of hostilities and withdrawal of occupying forces.35 
11 At the  beginning of  the  crisis  over  nationalization,  there  was  a  political  consensus
between  Eden  and  Labour  Party  leader  Hugh  Gaitskell  but  this  evaporated  as  the
Opposition did not support military action without approval from the United Nations.36
The Conservative government quickly realized that the fight against Nasser lay on an
unsound  foundation  from  a  legal  perspective  as  the  Egyptian  President’s
announcement implied buying out the Suez Canal Company shareholders.37 This partially
explains  why  the  Government  so  vehemently  sought to  win  a  propaganda  war
presenting  Nasser  as  the  villain  of  the  piece  whilst  secretly  preparing  for  military
action. Attempts to influence broadcasting took place internationally and on the home
front. 
 
Government Interference with Broadcasting during the
Suez Crisis
“[…] the BBC should do nothing to underline the existence of party division and disunity at a
time of crisis.”38
12 According  to  the  1946  White  Paper  on  broadcasting  policy,  the  treatment  of  a
particular story must be the same in overseas and domestic news bulletins.39 This was
hotly debated within the BBC. Retired military officer and director of BBC Overseas
services Ian Jacob quickly imposed his view that news items should be selected for Cold
War purposes:  “broadcasting to one’s  own people is  quite a different professional  job from
broadcasting to foreign countries, and efforts to try and escape from this difference are efforts to
put one’s head in the sand.”40 The British government for its part was acutely aware of the
success of Cairo-based Voice of  the Arabs (Sawt al-Arab)  service,  which was broadcast
across  the  Arab  world  and  helped  Nasser  in  his  bid  to  lead  an  Arab  nationalist
movement.41 According to  Professor  of  journalism Douglas  Boyd,  this  was  the “ first
international radio war among western countries over a developing region.”42 The Government
had already been attempting to influence radio and print in the vicinity to encourage
Arabs to join British-backed military forces in the context of the Second World War.
Although unknown to the general public at the time, the British Foreign Office was
funding the Near East Broadcasting Station (Sharq al-Adna) and in 1955 installed what was
then  considered  a  powerful  medium-wave  transmitter  in  Cyprus.43 The  BBC  whose
External  Services were  also  funded  by  the  Foreign  Office  occasionally  provided
assistance.  Indeed,  British  facilities  in  Cyprus  contributed  more  generally  to  the
activities  of  the  Central  Treaty  Organization,  a  pro-West  military  alliance  that  was
founded in 1955 and sought to curb Soviet influence in the Middle East. 
13 In October 1956, the Near East Broadcasting Station was officially requisitioned by the
British government and renamed the Voice of Britain: The Foreign Office took charge of
programming, the service Director as well as his staff either resigned or were fired and
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Arab BBC announcers were called in to keep the service running.44 The relay station
was eventually handed over to the BBC in 1957, as the British Government realized
during  the  Suez  Crisis  how  untrusted  and  ineffectual The  Voice  of  Britain was  as  a
propaganda tool. In November 1956, left-wing Labour MP Tony Benn denounced the
secrecy around the station’s operations and stated: “It is morally wrong, and it is not the
voice  of  Britain.”45 The  following  month,  left-wing  Labour  MP  Barbara  Castle  also
criticized the service as “a Government agency which is pouring out  partial  propaganda,
which, I must add […] is very dull and bad propaganda.”46
14  Despite the BBC being involved with the British government’s covert international
broadcasting and propaganda, tensions quickly rose at a domestic level in the period
from  Nasser’s  July  announcement  to  the  October  military  invasion  in  1956.  Prime
Minister Eden applied pressure on the press and broadcasters at the highest levels: He
exploited his  network of  personal  contacts  with ministers,  key newspaper and BBC
figures,  organized  nonattributable  political  briefings  and  pursued  methods  of
censorship.47 In  particular,  Eden  met  with  several  editors-in-chief  and  his  Press
Secretary, William Clark, held confidential press briefings as well as meetings with BBC
Director-General  Ian  Jacob  and  ITN  Editor  Geoffrey  Cox.48 The  Prime  Minister  also
demanded a televised ministerial address to the nation and succeeded in securing a
spot on a BBC Home Service radio programme (At Home and Abroad) for an outspoken
supporter of his policies on the Suez Canal crisis.49 Eden’s ally, Australian Liberal Prime
Minister Robert Menzies, had originally been side-lined from the broadcast due to the
announcement  that  British  Foreign  Secretary  Selwyn  Lloyd  was  going  to  make  a
ministerial address at around the same time. However, Eden telephoned BBC Chairman
Alexander  Cadogan  in  order  to  secure  Menzie’s  invitation.  It  is  noteworthy  that
Cadogan was also a government-appointed Director of the Suez Canal Company and had
previously been Eden’s Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office.
15 Yet  Eden’s  tactical  success  was  almost  immediately  mitigated.  This  may  be
demonstrated by the BBC’s decision to air a Light Service radio programme called Special
Survey on the Suez Canal Crisis,  on 15th August.  In the interests of voicing alternative
views to those of the Government, the programme included a pre-recorded excerpt
from a pro-Nasser Egyptian military officer,  Major Salah Salem. The very next day,
Eden ordered Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd to conduct an investigation into the
programme and the latter commented: “I think it an outrage that a body widely believed to
be in part at least associated with the British Government [the BBC] should broadcast at such a
moment a speech by a notorious enemy”.50 Eden also instructed the Colonial Secretary to
write  to  Postmaster  General51 Charles  Hill,  particularly  with  reference  to  the  BBC
Charter.  However,  the  Postmaster  General’s  response  highlighted  the  limits  of
Government interference with the Corporation’s editorial choices: “While the powers of
formal  intervention  remain so  limited,  it  is  only  by  informal  contact  and  discussion  that
programme contact can be influenced.”52 
16 Once again, Eden telephoned and wrote to BBC Chairman Cadogan and thus obtained a
promise not to broadcast any similar programmes during the London Conference. This
conference (the first of two) took place from 18th to 23rd August 1956 and was organized
by the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Invitations were sent to all states
that had signed the 1888 Constantinople Convention regarding Suez Canal oversight, as
well as those concerned by cargo shipping in the area. The British Government clearly
saw BBC airing of any divisive views regarding the Suez Crisis as likely to influence the
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attitude of conference attendees. On 17th August, Eden also summoned BBC Director-
General  Ian  Jacob  from  his  holidays  in  Suffolk  in  order  to  discuss  the  Suez  Canal
controversy.53 Although what transpired between the two is not exactly known, the
Prime Minister subsequently expressed his feeling that the BBC General-Director was
more aware of the Government’s position on the national interest and his belief that
informal prior consultation with the Corporation should be further developed. Eden
and his government saw the BBC as an influential national institution, which ought to
be utilized and watched over closely. It was no coincidence that they sought to install
permanent broadcasting facilities at N° 10 Downing Street in August that year.54
17 The Prime Minister’s direct and informal interventions at the highest levels of the BBC
were  also  accompanied  by  extra-legal  and  legal  measures,  which  favoured  self-
censorship. In particular, the Services, Press and Broadcasting Committee Secretary,
Admiral  George  Thomson,  issued  two  Defence  Notices  (D-Notices)  to  the  print  and
broadcast media in August and a further one on 1st November 1956.55 The media were
thus advised not to reveal any details of troop movements in the Middle East prior to
the invasion and of course the very existence of the D-Notices was to remain secret.
Subsequently little was published or broadcast on the issue of troop movements. 
18 The D-Notice system had been set up in 1912 as an alternative to “overt censorship”56 and
was the result of long-running debate between Parliament and the press dating back to
1880.57 Yet for the first fifty years, even Parliament did not know about the D-Notice
system’s activities58 and in the 1950s there were few breaches. In 1956, the committee
was composed of Services officials, press and broadcasting representatives for the BBC
and ITV. Although the D-Notice was a non-legally binding arrangement between the
British media and the government, news providers were under pressure to carry out
self-censorship. Indeed, editors had to carefully consider the post-publication and post-
broadcasting  legal  implications  should  they  go  ahead  despite  the  warning.  In
particular, there was always the risk of prosecution under the 1911 Official Secrets Act,
which provided no public interest defence for the media.
19 Censorship also stemmed from the BBC and ITV’s adherence to the Fourteen Day Rule,
which restricted public knowledge of political debate by forbidding radio and television
services from broadcasting news of any issues (beyond parliamentary proceedings) that
were  being  discussed  in  Parliament  for  a  period  of  fourteen  days.  Referred  to
pejoratively as the Fortnight Gag, this principle had been introduced voluntarily by the
BBC in 1944 and formalized as an aide-mémoire in 1947.59 In 1955, the BBC sought to have
the principle abandoned but Eden’s government insisted on making it an official rule.
Such a restriction on free speech reflected politicians’ perceptions of broadcasting as a
threat to the primacy of Parliament in the form of immediate scrutiny and commentary
by  an  unelected  body.  However,  the  experience  of  the  Suez  Crisis  and  ITV
developments  in  news  coverage  proved  to  be  too  much  for  Eden’s  government  to
withstand. The Fourteen Day Rule was suspended as of 18th December 1956.60
 
Conclusion
20 Tensions over independence and impartiality at the BBC during the 1956 Suez Crisis
were marked by the United Kingdom’s lingering attachment to an empire that was
already in decline. The crisis was manifold in the context of British post-war politics,
decolonisation and the Cold War. Anthony Eden’s Conservative government fought a
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ferocious propaganda war overseas and at home, and which severely limited the BBC’s
ability to provide impartial news. The BBC’s independence was at best ambiguous as
demonstrated by its implication in British government covert overseas broadcasting
and propaganda. There was a heavy reliance on an old boy network as reflected by
informal  exchanges  at  the  highest  levels.  This  was  facilitated  by  the  Government’s
authority  to  appoint  the  Corporation’s  Board  of  Governors  and  control  the  annual
television licence fee. Like the press, broadcasting was subject to censorship and self-
censorship in the build-up to the invasion. There was always the implicit threat of legal
action should the BBC not heed government advice. The golden age of British wireless
was giving way to the expansion of television but the radio propaganda war remained
essential  to  the  British  government  during  the  Suez  Crisis.  The  immediacy  of
broadcasting  was  still  perceived  as  a  threat  to  the  primacy  of  Parliament  and  the
Government clearly believed in the BBC’s power to influence public opinion, given that
it was already a well-established social institution with a nationalizing function. Both
the press and broadcasting were severely restricted in their ability to report on events
regarding the crisis. 
21 Egyptian President Gamal Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and the
ensuing  crisis  show  the  structural  weaknesses  of  the  BBC  in  the  face  of  British
government pressure,  yet  such  direct  and  informal  exchanges  regarding  editorial
choices were largely unknown to the general public. This perhaps helps to explain how
the Corporation survived with its reputation for independence and impartiality intact.
As events developed in the build-up to the invasion, cross-party political consensus was
lost. Eden and his government were unable to sustain an image of unity in the national
interest despite their best efforts. Yet the Labour Party as a whole did not benefit from
this political disarray. Harold MacMillan replaced Eden as Prime Minister and led the
Conservatives  to  victory  in  the  1959  general  election  whilst  vaunting  the  relative
prosperity of the country’s mixed economy and evidence of his strong stance against
Soviet influence. In any case, the BBC’s subsequent policy of giving as much domestic
and overseas airtime to Labour Party dissent as to Government views appears to have
been its saving grace.
22 In the following years, the broadcaster itself proudly reimagined the Suez Crisis as a
time when government pressure had been successfully resisted against all odds. For the
purposes of  the BBC’s review of  its  first  fifty years,  the organization published BBC
Handbook 1973,  which included remarks on the Suez Crisis  by then Director-General
Charles  Curran:  “Against  formidable  arguments  about  the  national  interest,  the  duty  to
provide an impartial  service was held by the BBC to be paramount,  and the pressures were
successfully  resisted”61.  The  reality  is  rather  more  nuanced  as  the  Corporation’s
interpretation of impartiality was so limited at that time. More generally, the case of
the Suez Crisis is situated in a long-running series of tensions between the BBC’s public
interest tenets and pressure from governments seeking favourable coverage in times of
conflict. From reporting of the decolonisation process and the Troubles to the Kosovo
War,  such tensions in the latter half  of  the twentieth Century are indicative of the
broadcaster’s  resistance  against  undue  interference,  albeit  with  varying  degrees  of
success.
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ABSTRACTS
As the world’s oldest national broadcaster, The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is unique
in its contribution to British life and its level of international influence. The BBC is well known
for its historic core mission (to inform, educate and entertain) and commitment to the principles
of independence and impartiality. Yet the definition and practical application of these tenets are
far  from  clear-cut.  Considered  by  some  to  be  a  quasi-autonomous  non-governmental
organization, the BBC has been subjected to much criticism throughout its long history regarding
its ability to resist State and corporate pressures. This article seeks to explore State pressures in
the context of calls for national unity in times of crisis when tensions with the BBC are at their
greatest. To this end, a qualitative analysis of the 1956 Suez Crisis is conducted and is linked to
the decline of the British Empire. This study shows the limited interpretation of impartiality by
the BBC at  that  time.  Anthony Eden’s  Conservative government fought a  propaganda war at
home  and  abroad  in  the  build-up  to  military  intervention.  The  BBC’s  independence  was
ambiguous at  best,  although it  emerged from the crisis  with its  reputation intact  due to  its
insistence on the notion of impartiality. 
Plus ancien diffuseur national du monde, la British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) est singulière au
vu  de  sa  contribution  à  la  vie  des  Britanniques  et  le  degré  d’influence  qu’elle  exerce  à
l’international.  La  BBC est  bien connue pour  sa  mission fondamentale  (informer,  éduquer  et
divertir)  et  son  attachement  aux  principes  d’indépendance  et  d’impartialité.  Pourtant,  la
définition et l’application de ces fondements ne sont guère évidentes. Considérée par certains
comme une  organisation  non-gouvernementale  quasi-autonome,  la  BBC  a  été  sujette  à  de
nombreuses critiques au fil  de son histoire concernant sa capacité à  résister à  des pressions
étatiques et corporatistes.  Cet article vise à explorer les pressions étatiques dans le contexte
d’appels à l’unité nationale durant des moments de crise, lorsque les tensions avec la BBC sont les
plus marquées. À cette fin, il convient de mener une analyse qualitative de la crise du canal de
Suez  de  1956,  qui  est  associée  au  déclin  de  l’empire  britannique.  Cette  étude  fait  ressortir
l’interprétation limitée du principe d’impartialité par la BBC à cette époque-là. Le gouvernement
conservateur  d’Anthony  Eden  mena  une  guerre  de  propagande  au  niveau  national  et
international durant la période précédant l’intervention militaire. L’indépendance de la BBC fut
au mieux ambiguë, mais l’organisation sortit de la crise sans que sa réputation soit ternie grâce à
son insistance sur la notion d’impartialité. 
INDEX
Mots-clés: BBC, censure, Crise du canal de Suez, impartialité, indépendance, autocensure
Keywords: BBC, censorship, Suez Crisis, impartiality, independence, self-censorship
AUTHOR
MÉLANIE DUPÉRÉ
Center for Research on the English-Speaking World, Université Sorbonne Nouvelle
Mélanie Dupéré holds a PhD in British Civilisation Studies from the University of Sorbonne
Nouvelle. She is an associate researcher at the University of Sorbonne Nouvelle’s Center for
BBC Independence and Impartiality: The Case of the 1956 Suez Crisis
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXVI-1 | 2021
14
Research on the English-Speaking World (EA 4399) and a teaching fellow at the University of Reunion
Island, specializing in English for Law and Economics.
Mélanie Dupéré est titulaire d’une thèse de doctorat en études anglophones (Civilisation
britannique) de l’Université de Sorbonne Nouvelle. Elle est chercheuse associée auprès du Center
for Research on the English-Speaking World (EA 4399), et enseignante à l’Université de La Réunion où
elle est spécialisée en Anglais juridique et économique. 
BBC Independence and Impartiality: The Case of the 1956 Suez Crisis
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXVI-1 | 2021
15
